Selected Philosophical Essays

Carl G. Hempel (1905-1997) was one of the preeminent figures in the philosophical movement of logical empiricism. The essays in this collection come from the early and late periods of Hempel's career. Most of these essays are hard to track down and four of them are appearing in English for the first time. Cumulatively they offer a fresh perspective on Hempel's intellectual development and on the rise and demise of logical empiricism. Richard Jeffrey has prepared the collection for publication, and has supplied introductory surveys to the essays as well as a brief biographical sketch of Hempel. Contents - Preface; Introduction; Part I. Truth: 1. On the logical positivists’ theory of truth; 2. Some remarks on ‘facts’ and propositions; 3. Some remarks on empiricism; 4. The problem of truth; 5. The irrelevance of the concept of truth for the critical appraisal of scientific claims; Part II. Probability: 6. On the content of probability statements; 7. On the logical form of probability statements; 8. A definition of degree of confirmation (with P. Oppenheim); Part III. Methodology: 9. The logical analysis of psychology; 10. Schick and Neurath: foundation vs. coherence; 11. On the cognitive status and the rationale of scientific methodology; 12. Provisoes; Part IV. Memoirs: 13. Rudolf Carnap, Logical Empiricist; 14. The Vienna Circle and the metamorphoses of its empiricism; 15. Hans Reichenbach remembered; 16. Empiricism in the Vienna Circle and in the Berlin Society; Part V. Publications of C. G. Hempel.